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Stan Weir**
Eighty-two San Francisco longshoremen, myself among them,
were fired from their jobs on the same day in 1963. The purpose of this
article is to report from a participant's viewpoint this event; the events
leading up to this mass firing; its context in the automation of the long-
shore industry; and the subsequent litigation, lasting until 1981, which
was generated by these discharges.
I. The Firing
While we longshoremen who were the objects of these firings were
at work on June 19, 1963, letters were delivered to each of our homes.
They contained notices that we had been "deregistered" (discharged)
as full-time employees of the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), an
employers' association. Somewhere in the port of San Francisco in the
preceding weeks we had been tried, found guilty and received the maxi-
mum sentence-economic capital punishment-all by secret process.
These events resulted in the first mass firing of longshoremen repre-
sented by the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union (ILWU) since that union was founded in the general west coast
maritime strikes of the 1930s. It also marked the first time that the
ILWU had ever been party to the discharge of dock workers.
*384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendants and ordering trial); 421 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1970) (sus-
taining trial court rulings dismissing individual defendants and claims for punitive and
exemplary damages); 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101
(1981).
**Publisher Singlejack Books, San Pedro CA. Former Instructor, Labor Educa-
tion Programs, Univ. of Illinois.
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Written under the letterhead of the Joint Port Labor Relations
Committee (JPLRC) of the PMA-ILWU, the identical and unsigned
discharge letters did not specify charges. Instead, they told us only that
the firings had been accomplished "pursuant to the provision of #9 of
the 'Memorandum of Rules Covering Registration and De-registration
of Longshoremen in the Port of San Francisco. . . . Such de-registra-
tion was based upon the determination of the Committee that you have
violated the applicable rules." Upon studying this provision, we discov-
ered that it contained a list of all the "applicable rules," ten of which
outlined specific violations; the eleventh, and last rule, allowed the gov-
erning parties to fire "for any other cause." This failure to specify
charges was a violation of the Memorandum of Rules which contained
in its text a model of the letter to be sent as notice of de-registration. In
the appropriate position on the model was a blank space under which
were the instructions, "Here list the charges."
In addition to this omission, the joint committee's letter of June
19, 1963 addressed to each of us read:
In the event that the Joint Labor Relations Committee re-
ceives within fifteen days after the date of this letter, a detailed
written statement signed by you, satisfactorily demonstrating that
there is no ground for your de-registration, and requesting a hear-
ing, you will be given a hearing, at which time you may show
cause, if any you have, why such de-registration should be
rescinded.
Even had we been willing to endure the submission, it was impossi-
ble for us to write demonstrations of our innocence as asked, or in any
other form, for we were denied a list of charges. The ILWU had a
national reputation as a progressive union yet every concept of demo-
cratic due process was being violated. There was no precedent for what
was happening to us and, although we knew that the rank and file exer-
cised limited power, we were witnessing a complete reversal in the ba-
sic role of a union. This was not the result of some veiled form of grad-
ual bureaucratic drift; the top officialdom of the ILWU was
collaborating with employers, literally doing management's job out in
the open by institutionalized means. The joint parties to the collective
bargaining agreement obviously felt free to select victims and then de-
sign new rules to dispose of them in brazen disregard of long-estab-
lished procedures.
At least twenty-five of us who received the deregistration notices
responded by asking for an immediate hearing. All requests were
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granted and appeal hearings were set for July 9, 10, and 11, 1963, in
the cargo shed on Pier 24 of the Embarcadero in San Francisco. Our
attempts to learn the charges and prepare a defense continued to prove
futile. Union officials would not meet with us or answer our phone calls,
registered letters or telegrams. A state of confusion, with many con-
flicting rumors, existed within the general membership of ILWU San
Francisco Local 10. The joint committee had accomplished the firings
without making the identities of the victims known to the rest of the
bargaining unit. Since the rank and file were no more organized than
we there was no vehicle for communication between them and those
who were terminated.
In an effort to exhaust all possibilities, on July 7, I sent the follow-
ing telegram to R.R. Holtgrave, then Secretary of the JPLRC, with
copies sent to ILWU International President Harry Bridges and PMA
President Paul St. Sure:
RECEIVED YOUR LETTER NOTIFYING ME THAT I AM
TO HAVE HEARING JULY 1 1TH. I WILL BE PRESENT
BUT YOU HAVE NOT YET TOLD ME THE CHARGE YOU
INTEND TO TRY ME FOR. I AGAIN REQUEST YOU SO
INFORM ME AND NOT FORCE ME TO APPEAR WITH-
OUT PREPARATION.
Holtgrave's answer by return wire on July 9th, became the one break
in the official silence that lasted until the opening day of the hearings.
It read:
YOUR UNION IS YOUR EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REP-
RESENTATIVE ON YOUR GRIEVANCE. UNLESS YOU IN-
TEND TO PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY WITH THE EM-
PLOYERS UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH
YOUR UNION REGARDING THE HEARING.
Section nine of the amended National Labor Relations Act, com-
monly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, allows employees to bypass their
union and to process their own grievances with management on an indi-
vidual basis. This was of no use to us because our fight was to get union
representation, not get away from it; to get collective protection and
put an end to the vulnerability we were experiencing as individuals. In
a last ditch effort just hours before the appeal hearings, I sent a copy of
Holtgrave's wire to Local 10 President James Kearney along with an
appeal for representation and the provision of charges. Even though
1984]
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Holtgrave's response designated the union as the terminated dock
workers sole legal representative, I received no reply.
On each of the hearing days the scene in the waiting room outside
the makeshift hearing chambers on Pier 24 had a "death row" atmo-
sphere. We gathered by numbers as instructed and awaited our turns.
None of us was broke or broken, but the experience was taking its toll.
There was none of the good humored banter that is commonplace at
dock worker gatherings. We had all now experienced unemployment
for three weeks. It was futile to file new job applications without listing
our employer for the previous four years. The PMA had denied our
unemployment insurance claims on the ground that we were "voluntary
quits," that is, we had followed a course of conduct that we knew could
end only in termination of employment. There was a silence among all
of us at the hearings because the futures of whole families were about
to be determined. Many of us could not expect to ever again find em-
ployment that equaled our chosen occupation. Ninety percent of our
number were black. They, and others as well, faced the specter of re-
turning to their marginal jobs of pre-waterfront years. We too had tem-
porarily withdrawn to that "low" which is the hope for individual
escape.
The door to the hearing chamber opened. A sergeant-of-arms
stuck his head out and called a name. One of our men answered, rose
stiffly and went inside. The door opened again a few minutes later and
another name was called. But what had happened to the first man? It
wasn't hard to make an accurate guess. As each hearing concluded the
appellant was being ushered out a rear exit, down an alternative stair-
way and off the pier. For us, the contrivement exposed the true nature
of the hearings and made us angry. When my turn came I entered and
took the lone chair facing the judges on the other side of the long table.
Local 10 President James Kearney and business agents Joe Perez and
Dick Harp nodded hello to me but R. R. Holtgrave of the PMA and
his two assistants did not look up from their papers. These six com-
prised the Joint Port Labor Relations Committee (JPLRC). It was
they who had signed the official deregistration notices. Now they were
acting as their own appellate court.
The biggest unknown for me, in that room at that point, was the
presence of eight or nine other men. The man in the boW tie seated at
the center of the table I guessed to be Richard Ernst, head counsel for
the PMA. The younger man next to him was obviously an assistant. In
the next seat was Tommie Silas, formerly a local union business agent
with a longtime reputation as an errand runner for Harry Bridges.
[Vol. 8
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Both Silas and the other former Local 10 official next to him had
stacks of paper in front of them, but Kearney and the other union offi-
cials did not have a scrap. Clearly, it was Silas and his colleagues who
were being cast in the role of prosecutors yet they held no elected of-
fice. Where did they get the authority?
My memory began to provide some possible explanations. These
men were members of the Joint B List Committee who five years ear-
lier had processed our applications and interviewed us along with about
seven hundred others who were being recruited to the industry. The
formation of this committee was viewed by some longshoremen as a
defeat for Local .10. Previously, from the beginning of the union, Local
10 had held substantial control over entry to employment in the port.
With the establishment of the Joint B List Committee, control over
hiring was now in the hands of the employers and the leadership of the
international union. I surmised that the B List Committee must have
been the body that tried us in secret and decided to discharge us. In
process were the beginnings of a move by the international union to
essentially eliminate Local 10's control of the grievance procedures by
which firings had been held to a minimum. Local 10 President Kearney
had thus far refused to make an issue of it before the rank and file. To
avoid open battle he was rubber stamping the victories of the PMA.
The mass discharge was going to remain a smokescreen for a continued
power grab, as will be seen later in this text.
JPLRC Secretary Holtgrave confirmed my chain of deductions. In
his role as hearing chairman he read to me from a list of rights and
instructions for appellants and stated that I was not to be allowed
counsel, the right to face accusing witnesses, nor the opportunity to
produce witnesses in my own behalf. I would be informed of the gen-
eral area of the rule infraction that I had committed, but I could only
learn the exact detail of the charges by going to the Joint PMA-ILWU
Records Office two weeks later. The chairman concluded his instruc-
tions to me with a statement to the effect that I was now free to make
any defense in my own behalf that I deemed appropriate. I questioned
Holtgrave and learned that the committee was going to make its final
judgment before we had the opportunity to learn the exact nature of
the charges in the Records Office and none of the signatory judges
would be present at that time to hear our defense. Holtgrave then
turned the hearing over to Silas who quickly stated that over a four-
year period I had falsified entries on job dispatch records to give me
more hours of work than I would have received had I not, in effect,
crowded into line ahead of co-workers during the daily hiring process. I
19841
5
Weir: New Technology: a Catalyst for Crises in Collective Bargaining, I
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
countered that his allegations were false. It was my word against his
and the only evidence of my innocence was the forms on which I had
allegedly made dishonest entries. Not surprisingly, they had somehow
been destroyed.
I warned all present that we would not submit to this frame-up
silently. I rose to leave but before I could reach the exit door the assis-
tant PMA attorney called me back. He had a set of questions designed
to get me to say that I considered the discharge action a form of dis-
crimination according to Section Thirteen of the union contract. That
section established an exclusive grievance procedure for anyone who
claimed he had been discriminated against for racial, religious, or other
reasons. The assistant PMA attorney's attempt to curtail our ability to
file suit in civil court failed. During a trial in federal court eleven years
later, this same man would be one of two former PMA attorneys to
testify in the plaintiff's behalf.
On the night of July 11, just three hours after the hearings con-
cluded, President James Kearney called a regular business meeting of
Local 10 to order. He then made a motion which demanded that the
eighty-two men who had been fired for alleged falsification of job dis-
patch sign-in sheets be returned to their jobs at once. Even if finally
proven guilty, thirty or more of the men who had been fired would have
been first offenders. The rules called for discharge only on the third
proven offense. A second motion was immediately made from the floor
by Hal Yanow, a former bodyguard of Harry Bridges. It demanded
that those of the eighty-two men who were fired for paying their dues
late eight times or more during their four years of employment be rein-
stated because there was no rule in existence which made that a disci-
plinary offense. All the men in question had each paid the standard one
dollar fine for each day they had paid late and none were in arrears at
the time of discharge. Many of those sitting in that meeting could
probably have been terminated under this very same rule. The recorded
minutes of the July 11, 1963, meeting show that both motions passed
by an "overwhelming majority."
Kearney presented these motions at the next meeting of the
JPLRC. The PMA contingent voted "nay." Due to the ensuing dead-
lock the motions were passed up to the next organizational level, the
Area Labor Relations Committee, for a decision. A member from each
side of that joint committee was present. They called themselves to or-
der and Local 10's motions were denied. With that vote, Local 10's
short and concerted effort to save us was dead.
About ten days later we lined up in front of the Joint Records
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Office. We wanted to exhaust every possibility for learning specifically
the charges against us. Our efforts produced little more information
than we already had. B List Committee members, one from each side,
were present to confront us with our supposed rule violations and an-
other stalemate ensued. They still were unable to present us with any
evidence of record falsification and insisted on their right to apply ret-
roactively the heretofore unheard of rules that had put us all in double
jeopardy.
Several days later we began to hear conflicting rumors from the
waterfront. We had heard that two of the firings had been rescinded
and that there might be an extension of the appeals procedure. Approx-
imately twenty-five of us gathered to talk over what had happened. As
a result of that meeting we sent a delegation to the PMA headquarters
to learn if any further appeals were possible. The answer was no. This
response and the lack of rank and file support demanded that we make
a decision, either to drop the whole matter and walk away or resort to
the courts. Few of us felt there was really a choice. Most had relatives
still working on the front. We were determined to prove our innocence
and we knew that- without jobs as longshoremen, many of us would be
demoted to poverty level incomes. Before relating a short history of our
seventeen-year legal battle it is necessary to provide some of the histori-
cal background for the discharges and their direct relationship to the
employers' present and planned investments in mechanized and com-
puterized cargo movement machineries.
IL. Historical Background
The first clarification that must be made is that the eighty-two
men fired in 1963 were not members of the ILWU. We worked under
its jurisdiction, but by agreement between the PMA and the union we
were not allowed to join. We were "B" men, part of approximately 750
men who began work on the San Francisco piers in 1959, eventually
known as the '59 men so that differentiations could be made as more
"B" men were brought into the industry in 1963, 1965, 1967 and 1969.
The San Francisco '59 men were the first to enter the shipping industry
in that port without membership in the ILWU since the formation of
the union. In effect, we were second class citizens.
Earlier, in 1934, west coast longshoremen had established the most
complete form of rank and file control over the daily hiring process
known to waterfronts around the world. As a result of an arbitration
award in 1934 by the Franklin Roosevelt administration's National
1984]
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Longshoremen's Board, longshoremen in each port took virtually total
control of recruitment in the industry. The local unions, rather than the
shipping companies, began to issue work permits to new longshoremen.
In San Francisco, "permit men" quickly became probationary members
of the union and at the end of a six 'month period they became eligible
for full union membership. After their formal induction into the union,
local union officials applied for and routinely obtained registered status
for them. This procedure involving a substantial form of workers' con-
trol was weakened during World War II and came under full attack in
the 1950s with the introduction of new technology.
In 1952, top military transportation authorities, acting under the
auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, began to urge the na-
tion's ship operators to jettison traditional man-handled or by-the-piece
cargo operations in favor of new methods utilizing large metal contain-
ers moved in and out of new type vessels by giant cranes or on truck
trailers. As the first containership was being introduced in the Pacific
trade by Matson in 1957, the waterfront employers went to ILWU
President, Harry Bridges, with a proposal for a new method of recruit-
ing longshoremen. They wanted a pilot program that would take con-
trol of that process from the rank and file and place it in the hands of
the top officials. After several attempts, Bridges was able to overcome
rank and file resistance to the program and implemented it the follow-
ing year.
During 1958, the appointees to the B List Committee screened
over ten thousand applicants and made selections for employment. In
June and August of the following year, over seven hundred of these
applicants went to work as full time hold-men, those who work inside
the hatches of the ships in port. The conditions of their employment
were new and in many ways consistent with the "B" label. Not only
were they denied membership in the union, but in order to attend union
meetings they had to sit in a segregated section of the balcony in the
meeting hall.
It is hard to imagine a more restrictive definition of "permanent
status" employees than the one applied to us as '59 B men. It did not
matter that our incomes were often less because we got the work that
was left after the A men (union members) took their pick of the jobs
available each day. If we took a second or part time job outside the
industry--or enrolled in a school-we were subject to deregistration.
We received the same basic pay as the A men, but in other conditions
of employment there were substantial dissimilarities. The inability to
participate in the election of union officials, for example, meant that we
[Vol. 8
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too often worked without the benefit of on-the-job union protection.
This arrangement was formalized by the creation of an especially strin-
gent set of disciplinary rules for governing our conduct. At the same
time, there was no limitation put on the time we had to serve before
getting union membership and A status, even though we had been
promised that "graduation" would occur within a year, at maximum.
The official reason which circulated around the waterfront for the
creation of a B category of longshoremen was that most of the "old-
timers," who were registered prior to 1948, found hold work difficult.
In their advancing middle age they had taken the less physically ardu-
ous jobs on deck and dock. This meant that in the years just prior to
the recruitment of the B workers, most of those doing hold work were
hired off the street on a daily basis. The recruitment of a new cadre of
hold men was a necessity for the employers but there was a problem.
The planned container technology soon to be introduced would elimi-
nate thousands of jobs in a few years. It would be difficult to lay off
"recent hires" if they had a voice in the union. The B list program was
the attempted solution to the employers' dilemma.
The program. had additional dividends for the employers. It per-
formed the function of splitting the work force, which would be partic-
ularly valuable if resistance to the introduction of new technology de-
veloped. There was also another factor which also cannot be
overlooked; on the Pacific Coast waterfronts and around the world,
hold workers are traditionally the most militant section of the labor
force. Not only are they the youngest and most active, they comprise
the tightest unit within the total longshore gang operation because they
work deep in the hatch where entry by supervisors can involve some
risk.
The '59 B men came to the waterfront at the time when the first
mechanization and modernization (M&M) collective bargaining agree-
ment was being negotiated. It was ratified by the A men on a coastwide
basis in 1960 and went into effect in early 1961. Bridges had made a
bargain in which most of the work rules won by the union in the 1930s
were sold in return for the creation of a special money fund. It gave all
A men retiring at age sixty-five a bonus of seventy-nine hundred dollars
or the bonus could be used by those who wanted to take early retire-
ment.1 Thus, the disappearance from the front of the generation which
had built the union was hastened.
1. In the second six-year mechanization contract which went into effect in 1966,
the bonus was raised to $13,600.
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In 1960, the port of Los Angeles was the second larget on the
west coast. Its ILWU Local 13 organized the strongest resistance to
this agreement and was the only local whose majority voted against the
contract. The local came under hard attack. A popular business agent
was fired after representing men involved in a stop work action. Bridges
negotiated a special and more restrictive version of the mechanization
agreement for that port and subsequently a majority of Local 13 ap-
proved it. Short of waging an all-out rebellion, they had no choice. We
in San Francisco were unaware of any resistance in Los Angeles until
we found ourselves working cargoes originally destined for that port.
In San Francisco, the only group resistance to this agreement,
however modest, came from the B men. During the long negotiation
period, we badgered A men informally on the job about the concessions
that Bridges was making to the employers. The resentment among us
became very apparent in the early months of 1960. True to its word, as
soon as we had put in six months on the job, Local 10 formed its inves-
tigating committee and began to process us for membership. They were
stopped by higher level authority within management and the union.
The freeze on A registrations was rationalized because the automation
of the industry was just ahead. Many jobs would be eliminated and the
jobs of even senior men were in jeopardy in certain ports. The men in
those ports with high seniority had a right to move to ports not yet
"distressed." They took precedence over B men. Our admission to the
union and registration as A men would have to wait until the impact of
containerization was studied on a coastwide basis.
The top officials of the local and many rank and file members ex-
pressed deep doubts about these delays. There was talk that the inter-
national union and the PMA were using automation as an excuse to
encroach upon the rights of the local. Fear of the effects of the coming
containerization was running high but it was hard for many of the
workers to suddenly develop a distrust of Bridges. He regularly came to
local meetings and talked as though the introduction of the new tech-
nology and a resolution of the B men's concerns, was months instead of
years ahead. Over half of the membership of Local 10 were black men.
In vast majority they had come to the Bay area in search of jobs at the
outbreak of World War II. Circumstances had led them into longshore
work. Unlike the experience of many of their friends who entered other
industries at that time, the ILWU did not segregate its black workers
into "colored" locals and for them Bridges symbolized that positive ex-
perience. It was extremely difficult for them to now believe that this
same man was manipulating them.
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Not long after the freeze on A registrations and union member-
ship, the executive board of Local 10 passed an unexpected motion
which urged that the B men elect representatives to the executive
board. At the next B men's meeting, three representatives were elected.
I was one of them. All three of us openly expressed our own feelings,
and those of the men who had elected us, against the mechanization
agreement. We were under full attack the moment we arrived at our
first board meeting. What some members called the "Bridges group,"
led by International Representative William Chester, raised so many
objections to our presence that no business could be conducted. Several
months later two of the B representatives, William Davis Edwards and
Robert Marshall, were fired.
On the first day that the mechanization agreement went into ef-
fect, hold men found themselves working sling loads of hand-handled
cargo that were double or more the weight of those that had been
hoisted in and out of hatches the previous day. Thus, the elimination of
the work rule that had for twenty-five years limited man-made sling
loads to 2,100 pounds was the first change to be felt. Other work rule
losses were experienced in turn. Principally among these was a rule the
longshoremen had won in order to protect the autonomy of each work
gang. The rule denied walking bosses the right to fire individuals from
gangs and make those who replaced them work short handed; thus
eliminating the employer's ability to single out so-called troublemakers.
"If they want to fire one of us they will have to fire us all", had been
the 1930s approach to the problem. The new agreement circumvented
the rule by cutting the number of hold men in a gang from eight to
four. Eight men were still required on hand stowage operations so half
that number were dispatched to the gangs with the artificial label of
"swingmen" who could then be fired singly.
While these changes in the relations between supervisors and
workers on the job were being made there was little change in the na-
ture of cargo handling methods. Despite the negotiation of a so-called
"automation" contract in 1960, the mass introduction of container
technology, as some had suspected, did not occur until the late 1960s.
For half a decade employers were able to run hand-stow and discharge
operations, virtually free of work rules. Production almost doubled.
Thus, the longshoremen were directly subsidizing the purchase of the
very machines that would kill over half their jobs by 1980.2
2. As of 1982, there were less than eight thousand active registered longshore-
men working on the west coast of the United States.
19841
11
Weir: New Technology: a Catalyst for Crises in Collective Bargaining, I
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
As productivity climbed, so did accident rates. Between 1958 and
1967, U.S. waterfront employers reported a 92.3 percent increase in
the number of workers' compensation cases "despite efforts to engineer
problems out of the workforce. ' '3 This condition increased their open
lobbying of the A men for entry into'the union, but the long and grad-
ual growth in their boldness was reversed in one night by Harry
Bridges. The founding president of the ILWU addressed a compulsory
meeting for B men in early 1962. His blunt speech climaxed with the
statement that "[we B men] were getting black marks all the time and
not just from the employer side." Minutes later Bridges returned to the
microphone and announced that the B men no longer had any repre-
sentatives of their own because "we are representing you," and added
that if we wanted responsible advice we should seek counsel from a B
man and close friend of his, Pat Tobin (later to become the ILWU
representative in Washington, D.C.). Local 10 vice president Walter
Nelson chaired the meeting and was the only local union official pre-
sent. He heard Bridges totally wipe out the representation of B men on
the local's executive board. The international union had just violated
the local union's autonomy, yet Nelson made no challenge and the
meeting adjourned.
For the next six months there was far less communication between
A and B men on the job. The silence of the B men was so sustained
that probably it was construed as a threat. Informal pressures were
being felt off the job as well as on. Waterfront talk that originated in
official circles had already made it clear that the cargo movement
needs of the war in Viet Nam were sustaining shipping activity at high
levels and that rapid attrition in the ranks of A men had pushed their
average age to fifty-six. Late in 1962, Harry Bridges went to a Local
10 membership meeting to announce that he had a "Christmas present
for the B men." There was applause. Many A men had sons, nephews
or relatives on the B List. Bridges climaxed his speech with the promise
that sometime early in 1963, the B men would be promoted to the A
list. He added that a new B list would be recruited to take their place.
The audience's mild elation disappeared with that last bit of news;
there were groans but no formal objections.
Regardless of the seeming good humor with which Bridges made
the "promotion announcement," the development presented his leader-
3. Paper by T. H. Bryans, "The Australian Waterfront Labor Scene," No.15,
p.14, delivered at the International Container Terminal Operators Conference, Oak-
land, CA. (October 1979).
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ship, its supporters in Local 10 and the employers, with the potential of
a deep threat. Over five hundred new members would enter the head-
quarters port of the ILWU at one time, all with strong voice and vote.
These men had already shown a willingness to attend local business
meetings in large numbers even though they had been relegated to seg-
regated balcony seating. Unlike so many of their elders, they were not
awesome supporters of the union's international president. For almost
four years they had watched Bridges attend meetings in which he per-
sonally frustrated the efforts of rank and file A men to bring B men
into the union. An important and additional crisis factor existed be-
cause the participation of A men in union meetings had dwindled with
their advancing age, to the extent that the meeting quorum was re-
duced to four hundred. Enfranchising the '59 B List meant that all of
Local 10's long-established power relationships were about to be
changed. The men who governed the industry were faced with a whole
series of unknowns. The Bridges leadership and the employers had the
choice of either letting democratic processes naturally determine the
course of change or to intervene. They chose the latter.
Harry Bridges attended another Local 10 membership meeting in
early 1963, during which he announced the near finalization of plans to
open A registrations or "remove the freeze." But he concluded by re-
vealing that there were about a hundred "troublemakers" among the B
men who would have to be eliminated from the industry altogether.
Previously the plan had been to hold any workers who did not meet
existing membership standards in B status for a penalty period. But
this action was not even contemplated since none among the B men was
awaiting disciplinary trial for any alleged infractions. Bridges' proposal
was booed and openly rebutted from the floor. It was probably right
after this rejection of Bridges that the three top officials of Local 10,
headed by James Kearney, made plans to induct the nearly four hun-
dred B men who had already been processed by the local's own Investi-
gating Committee. Two weeks later they did just that over Bridges'
objection. When the ceremony ended, Bridges took the microphone to
state that the A registrations of those just initiated would be held up.
The secretary-treasurer of the local, Reino Erkkila, was outraged and
announced that he had only that day seen, in the PMA offices, the
signed and completed registrations of the men who had just taken oath.
Bridges returned to the podium once more to state that that action
could be "reversed." The next morning the new members of ILWU
Local 10 were dispatched to the job as A men. By noon the word
spread around the front that their registrations had been rescinded.
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The rumor proved true. The next day they were returned to their jobs
as B men.
Bridges went back to the local membership for a second try in
May. He presented a motion that would allow some higher authority to
fire a hundred or so "troublemakers". In support of his own motion he
urged that those present not allow "a few to stand in the way of the
many." Everyone knew what he meant. Over four hundred were to be
denied A status until the membership allowed him to fire four of five
score unnamed but already marked men. The motion passed. Hal Ya-
now jumped to a floor microphone and called attention to the union's
flag in its stand behind Bridges' chair. In six-inch gold letters across its
breadth was the statement: "An injury to one is an injury to all." Ya-
now was one of the handful who understood that there are no
rainchecks in the fight against injustice.
It is doubtful that more than a few longshoremen were yet aware
that the B List Committee was the administrative vehicle for carrying
out Bridges' motion. There was a perception that Bridges now had the
power to fire whomever was on that list and with this came an even
deeper disintegration of on-the-job relationships. Which one hundred
among the more than five hundred B men were on the list? I, for one,
experienced a marked increase in isolation. Not only had I been one of
the B representatives, there was talk that I was handicapped by having
previously held membership in both the Sailors' Union of the Pacific
and the United Auto Workers, both of which were said to have leader-
ships that Bridges held in disrepute for political reasons. As has already
been revealed, I did in fact occupy a place on Bridges' list, but in those
weeks there was hardly a B man who was not examining his past to
find something within it that might now cause his undoing. Given all
the unknowns it is doubtful that many were at peace. Rumors went out
that several workers had begun to go daily to the offices of the interna-
tional union and sit hat in hand waiting for an audience with William
Chester, a union official, who it was said, had the power to launder
them. Even among those who would surely be deregistered, hope ex-
isted side by side with despair. Each of us felt that somehow maybe we
would make it and we outwardly conducted ourselves in postures of
normalcy. There are experiences far this side of "holocaust" which
make the ordinary conduct of European Jews about to enter oven com-
pounds absolutely understandable.
On the same-day that we eighty-two received deregistration let-
ters, the hostage A registrations were released. The survivors of the
"promotion process" entered the union in an atmosphere of defeat. At-
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tainment had come without satisfaction. There was a sense that the
position they occupied was actually closer to A-minus and was possibly
still revocable. It wasn't hard to conclude that anyone could have been
among the deregistered if the new and previously unknown set of disci-
plinary rules had been applied retroactively to his employment record.
"If they want to bad enough, they can get anyone."
The men who governed the industry had won an important victory.
They had conducted an offensive and not once had their opposition
stepped outside the containment of existing collective bargaining rela-
tionships. So successful was their strategy that it was not until 1971
that open rank and file resistance to the mechanization concessions,
though still in established channels, resurfaced. The rebellion took the
form of the longest longshore strike in American history. But the eight
years between 1963 and 1971 gave PMA members the time needed for
the mass introduction of the container moving machineries that are
now being roboticized. In 1964, or one year into that eight year period,
the first real victims of longshore automation on the west coast became
the plaintiffs in Williams v. PMA.
III. The Legal Battle
The Pacific Maritime Association made it relatively easy for us
disenfranchised longshoremen to organize. It is probable that most of
our motivating anger was directed at ILWU officials, but the employers
provided an immediate and practical reason for unification. The PMA,
as reported in Part I, had denied our claims to unemployment benefits.
In order to appeal that denial we were faced with the necessity of hir-
ing a lawyer. The initial step in our self-organizing drive was accom-
plished in the lines at the unemployment insurance office on the Mon-
day following the Friday that we were fired. Late in July, after we had
exhausted all appeals, approximately thirty of us met in San Francisco
at the home of one of our number, Cleo Love. Our informal organiza-
4. Late in 1971, ILWU members voted to strike by a 96 percent majority. After
101 days, a Taft-Hartley Act injunction sent them back to work for the "80 day cool-
ing off period." With that time served, 93 percent voted to resume the strike. The basic
goal of the ranks was to eliminate the employer's right to bypass the hiring hall when
recruiting steady men for container terminal jobs. They twice rebuked their interna-
tional president for refusing to negotiate an end to this concession. After 30 more days
of picketing they accepted the third contract offer brought before them by Bridges but
it too contained the paragraph that had given a large portion of control over hiring
back to the PMA.
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tion and division of labor needed structuring. We formed the Long-
shore Jobs Defense Committee (LJDC) and elected a steering commit-
tee which included James U. Carter, Willie Hurst, Arthur Jackie
Hughes, Willie Jenkins, Jr. and Arthur Winters, with Eathen Gums,
Jr. and me as co-chairs. This committee became the core group that
held the LJDC together for the next seventeen years.
On that first meeting night, after developing a plan to track down
and bring in the others who had been fired, the steering committee was
assigned the task of interviewing attorneys to represent us at the unem-
ployment insurance appeal hearings. We could not find a pro-union la-
bor law firm that was willing to consider taking our case. None could
afford to participate in a suit against a union. We also found that law
firms regularly associated with liberal social reform movements could
not conceive of representing anyone against "a progressive union like
the ILWU." Finally, our search was reduced to tracking down random
leads. We were always treated with courtesy. Many took time out of
their busy schedules to listen carefully to our story but candidly ex-
plained that a case like ours was outside their area of expertise. Others
simply could not afford to take on a case with more than thirty plain-
tiffs who could pay the needed fees only on a contingency basis. We
also met some who felt they could not afford to take on an important
segment of the power establishment in the San Francisco area. We
could understand how easily we could become a liability to our own
counsel.
Within five months after our deregistrations we participated in
hearings before California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Referee, Donald Gilson. Sidney Gordon, a Los Angeles attorney and
high school friend of mine, represented the LJDC's thirty-three mem-
bers. After hearing fifteen days of argument and testimony from both
sides, Referee Gilson ruled that the claimants were "not subject to dis-
qualification," that the employers' account was to be charged and our
benefits paid. He had been unable to find any "just cause" for our dis-
charge in the explanation given by the PMA.
In the "Reasons for Decision" section of Gilson's ruling he noted
several of the conditions surrounding our deregistration that later
caused the federal courts to hear our case. Among them he listed the
following: we had been subjected to double jeopardy; the JPLRC min-
utes for July 16, 1963 contained statements by the union members of
the committee to the effect that the discharges had been accomplished
by use of a new and previously non-existent set of disciplinary rules
applied on an ex post facto basis, and that there was no evidence that
612 [Vol. 8
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we had left the employ of the PMA on a voluntary basis.
The Gilson decision in May 1964 boosted our morale. We had
gone through the long hearing without a traumatic expenditure of en-
ergy and had won with relative ease. The facts of the case were still
fresh in our minds; recounting the story of our discharges had not yet
become routine. The victory raised our hopes for success in upcoming
court battles. A month earlier in April 1964, Attorney Gordon had
filed a complaint6 in federal court on behalf of fifty-six LJDC mem-
bers. It sought relief in the form of job reinstatement as B men, back
wages and six hundred thousand dollars in special damages. In addition
to listing the PMA and ILWU as defendant organizations, individual
defendants were named. Officers of both the employers, association and
the union were designated. James Kearney and Harry Bridges were in-
cluded in the union grouping. While Kearney had tried to save us in his
fashion he had also signed the order for our deregistration.
We fifty-six plaintiffs found it difficult to accept the idea that be-
cause we were B men at the time of the firings, for legal and technical
reasons, we could not seek restitution to jobs that had A status and
union membership. The others on the 1959 B List who had not suffered
discharge for unjust cause were now secure A men. We had to down-
grade our expectations. Victory in the courts could bring only partial
relief. Our desperation made that sufficient reason to go on. Then, too,
there was no other choice. Even the complaint itself had given us addi-
tional tension; our lawyer had not reviewed its contents with us before
submitting it to the court.
Shortly after Sidney Gordon filed his second amended complaint
with the clerk of the district court, the Joint Port Labor Relations
Committee (JPLRC) revealed that they would soon hold a hearing to
decide if we should get another hearing. The committee scheduled a
second set of appeal hearings to take place in March 1965. Our counsel
obtained a restraining order against them but the hearings were con-
ducted even though the order was still in effect. Only one plaintiff ap-
peared, Cleo Love. ILWU counsel Norman Leonard offered to re-
present him. Love had a heated verbal exchange with Harry Bridges
and received yet another affirmation of his discharge. Approximately
5. In the Matter of. James U. Carter, California Unemployment Insurance Ap-
peals Board Case Number SF-3033, San Francisco Referee Office, May 14, 1964, at
11-14.
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six months later the Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee (JCLRC),
on which both PMA President Paul St. Sure and Harry Bridges sat,
held a hearing on the basis of the previous hearing and found us guilty
as charged.
Our case experienced its first full scale internal crisis in mid-1965.
The third amended complaint that had been submitted to the court on
our behalf also failed to make a clear statement of our case. Equally
disturbing, Gordon once again made a series of statements about the
nature of the discharge action without discussing them or his basic the-
ory of the case with us. Frictions grew all the more rapidly because
several of the more needy among us were behind in their monthly pay-
ments to Gordon; payments were being accepted by him without regu-
larly issuing receipts; and we had not yet formulated a method of rais-
ing monies from outside sources. After a disturbing separation from
Gordon by all but three of us, the group once again began looking for
legal representation. Gordon took action to garnish the wages or attach
the belongings of over half of us. We then hired an attorney who spe-
cialized in matters of this sort and the harassment ended.
We were absolutely broke, but had recently armed ourselves with
several hundred reprints of a two-part article about our case which had
appeared in 1964. 7 By using it as a way of introducing ourselves, it
became possible to build a special support group of prominent public
citizens under the auspices of the Workers Defense League (WDL) of
New York. It was then headed by the renowned labor-civil rights attor-
ney, Rowland Watts, and Robert Joseph Pierpont. With the special
help of the late Paul Jacobs, labor and anti-nuclear journalist, the
LJDC-WDL Defense Committee was put together. Jacobs got Bayard
Rustin of the A. Phillip Randolph Institute and organizer of Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s March on Washington to co-chair the committee
with Michael Harrington, author of the epochal book, The Other
America. A dozen more were added to the committee's roster including
novelists Harvey Swados (now deceased); Herbert Gold; Nat Hentoff;
Julius Jacobson; Rev. William Shirley; Phillip Selznick; Daniel Bell;
the late Norman Thomas; Herbert Hill, then Labor Secretary of the
NAACP; Norman Hill, then national secretary of CORE; Herman
Benson, founder of the Association for Union Democracy (AUD); and
Gordon Haskell, then a full time official of the ACLU.
The WDL provided us with the services of Irving Thau of the New
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York and federal bars and famed civil rights attorney Francis Heisler.
Thau came to San Francisco and hired Arthur Brunwasser as co-coun-
sel. Together they filed a fourth amended complaint. It sought relief in
two forms; job reinstatement as B men and payment of all wages lost.
The late Judge George B. Harris was assigned to our case. He ruled
against giving us a trial. He indicated that our complaint had not es-
tablished a solid argument for trial in civil court and that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was the appropriate agency to ap-
proach for relief.8 In 1967, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in San Francisco remanded our case back to the court of
Judge Harris for trial. An appeal, written by attorneys Brunwasser and
Thau, had successfully turned the tables. Ninth Circuit Judges Pope
Hamley and Merrill gave clear instruction to the lower court:
It should be noted also that the appellants assert the complete
invalidity of the so-called new rules. Some of the affidavits filed on
behalf of the defendants purport to set out what these new rules
were. But, if there were an agreement to such rules, they were not
adopted in accordance with the requirements of the basic collective
bargaining agreement which provided in Section 22: "No provision
or term of this agreement may be amended, modified, changed al-
tered or waived except by written document executed by the parties
hereto." An examination of the text of the so-called new rules dis-
closes that they do not cover or authorize de-registration of Class B
longshoremen; they deal only with the requirements for promotion
from class B to A ...
Some of the affidavits disclose the powers of the joint commit-
tees, referred to, and they indicate the manner in which the plain-
tiffs became registered and they show that the joint committees
found against these plaintiffs and ordered them de-registered. But
the basis of the complaint is that the union representatives on the
joint committees should not have taken such action in that by
agreeing thereto they had failed in their fiduciary duty to all long-
shore employees.
As indicated above, the complaint alleged that these plaintiffs
were in good standing, were guilty of no current infractions, had
corrected all past violations of rules, and were entitled to the as-
signment for work. Nothing in any affidavit negatives the allegation
8. The ruling was preceded by a hearing on our complaint before the court. Our
former counsel, Sidney Gordon, was seated at the defendants' table conferring with the
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these plaintiffs were arbitrarily and capriciously being penalized for
conduct that was not ground for de-registration at the time the acts
were committed; that the de-registration was a retroactive applica-
tion of alleged violations of invalid rules. Furthermore, many of the
assertions made in these affidavits are not entitled to consideration
under Rule 56(e) which provides that affidavits must be made on
personal knowledge, and that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated. None of the affiants would be competent to say
whether any of the plaintiffs were guilty of any misconduct or rule
violation, or that the action of the union members of these joint
committees was anything other than a disregard of the union's duty
of fair representation.9
In the process of instruction, the Ninth Circuit's remand order
cited the precedent set earlier in the year by the United States Su-
preme Court's Vaca v. Sipes1" decision:
The Argument of the Supreme Court is a very cogent one. For
instance, the Court noted that the Board's general counsel had un-
reviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice
complaint. Therefore the injured party having a valid claim based
on denial of fair representation could not be assured of a remedy if
the courts were deemed ousted of their traditional jurisdiction in
such cases. At any rate, this reason given by the trial court for
denying jurisdiction is demonstrably wrong in view of Vaca.11
The employers and the union appealed the Ninth Circuit's reversal
and remand of Judge Harris' summary judgement against us to the
Supreme Court. The high court refused to review their appeal.12 De-
spite our victory at this point, our opposition was soon able to frustrate
again our efforts to obtain a trial. Shortly after we organized the
LJDC-WDL Defense Committee for the purpose of making our case
known to the public and raising monies to cover legal costs, Harry
9. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1967).
10. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
11. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d at 937-8. Five of the men fired
in 1963 had taken their cases to the NLRB. A local San Francisco trial examiner
Herman Marx, ruled that their deregistrations were invalid and that they should be
returned to their jobs as B men. On December 5, 1965, John H. Fanning, Gerald A.
Brown and Sam Zagoria, as general counsel for the NLRB, reversed the Marx ruling
in favor of the PMA and ILWU. Accord, Pacific Maritime Ass'n (Johnson Lee), 155
NLRB 1231, 1234, (1965).
12. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1967).
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Bridges sued most of the committee's members for libel. Bayard Rustin
was particularly singled out. The action cited a written appeal for
funds sent out by the committee mentioning Bridges' role in the dis-
charges. The suit was withdrawn in 1969, less than a week before it
was to go to trial. 13 It cost us a great deal. Time and serious illness had
elminated attorneys Thau and Heisler from participation in our case.
For some time Arthur Brunwasser had been acting alone on our behalf
and the libel suit made it impossible for him to devote time to the main
case. In 1965, all the plaintiffs signed individual contracts with him. He
was to receive payment for his efforts only if we won. In the interim we
were to pay all legal fees and expenses. In 1969 he had already worked
for us for four years without compensation. The libel action had cost us
more than a year's time at that point for it would be three years before
we would again be able to raise the money necessary for trial in the
district court.
In the years just prior to our 1974 trial before Judge Harris, our
case came under a unique handicap. The attorneys for the PMA and
ILWU went before the court and were successful in getting an order
that struck the names of individual defendants from our complaint. At
the same time the international union established that ILWU Local 10
was a third responsible party of their side. Thus the membership was
obligated to pay a share of the legal costs incurred, and if we prevailed,
a portion of the settlement. We not only needed the support of the rank
and file upon our possible return to the docks, but during the period of
legal battle as well. Additionally, a majority of us still had relatives as
well as friends working the ships. This all added up to increased strain
in the case. Before the litigation was over, longshoremen in locals up
and down the west coast would be assessed for the legal costs incurred
by the union defendants because of the Bridges' leadership.
Time and polarization of differences on national political issues in
the late 1960s and early 1970s had caused a disintegration within the
LJDC-WDL Defense Committee. It was reorganized. We got James
Baldwin, Kay Boyle, Staughton Lynd, Phyliss Jacobson, Hal Draper,
Clancy Sigal, Dan Georgakas, Stanley Aronovitz and others to fill the
vacanices created by the deaths of Norman Thomas, Harvey Swados,
and San Francisco civil rights leader Dr. Thomas Burbridge. A new
fund drive was successful. The time for trial preparation had arrived.
13. See Weir, The Retreat of Harry Bridges, NEw POLITICS (Winter 1969) re-
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Early in the long depositions period, the book, Harry Bridges: The
Rise and Fall of Radical Labor in the United States, was published
and immediately received prominent display in San Francisco book
stores. Its author, Professor Charles Larrowe of Michigan State Uni-
versity, was already considered an authority on the ILWU because of
an earlier book comparing daily longshore hiring systems on the east
and west coasts of the United States. 4 The later book on Bridges con-
tained a ten page discussion of our case. Despite Larrowe's statement
that I had been victimized by Bridges for political reasons, the entire
section was filled with part-truths that made it totally misleading, a
tool that could only misinform people who had no way of checking the
accuracy of his reporting. Worst of all, he dressed his discussion of the
other men who were fired in just enough fact (given him by ILWU
staff) to give it the ring of an informed source. His assessment of the
firings ended with the sentence, "[i] n almost all of these cases, the men
admitted the charges and accepted the verdict."15 Regardless of inten-
tion, the statement that any of our men confessed to the allegations
against them fails to reflect reality. In truth, some of our men, for ex-
ample, had not only admitted late payment of dues, but had confronted
their accusers with a counter-offensive: "How is it that lateness of dues
payment for which I have already paid the fine has suddenly become a
rule, a rule that can be retroactively applied and a rule whose violation
brings unappealable discharge?"
Let us take another example, that of Willie Hurst. During his first
year of employment on the waterfront a banana dock walking boss
fired the entire gang in which Hurst was working, for drinking on the
job. Before being cited by the Port Labor Relations Committee, Hurst
went to Local 10 president James Kearney and explained that the gang
had been fired for the remainder of the day because of the drunkenness
of one man. Kearney easily confirmed that Hurst was a lifetime "teeto-
taler," but advised him not to testify to the facts when the case was
heard. If Hurst were to accuse the particular A man in question of
being drunk, and the cause of the firing, he would probably never get
promoted to A status. Kearney was right. Hurst was given the penalty
for first offenders, thirty days off the job without pay and was told to
avoid further violations. He served his time and heeded the warning.
Almost three working years later, in 1963, he was penalized a second
14. C. P. LARROWE, THE SHAPE-UP AND THE HIRING HALL, (1955).
15. C. P. LARROWE, HARRY BRIDGES: THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL LABOR
IN THE UNITED STATES, 364 (1972).
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time for the same incident, but this time he was given the sentence
reserved for three time offenders, discharge. Yes, in a sense he did ad-
mit the charges, but only if one is operating without regard to context.
And, in no way did Hurst or the others accept the verdict. Larrowe's
book served to obscure the entire question of the new rules and the
escalation in the punishments connected with old rules often twice
applied.16
Our federal case, Williams v. PMA,17 came before the court sit-
ting without jury on January 14, 1974, and continued until July 3rd,
with more than sixty days of live testimony. The trial revealed a num-
ber of facts in the case that startled us. One such example occurred
when PMA officials testified that the special rules by which we were
discharged did not originate in any of the joint PMA-ILWU commit-
tees, but in a separate session of top officers and legal staff. It was then
that testimony revealed how the special rules were not adopted by the
Joint Coast Labor Relations Committee until after the appeal hearings
in July 1963, and remained in effect only a few short weeks. To this
date they have never been revived.
Judge Harris sat through testimony of this sort as well as routine
procedural matters without any reaction. We hoped that this was part
of his professional demeanor but it was about this time that a number
of the plaintiffs began to wish that the case had been heard by a jury.
It also bothered us that Judge Harris seemed to be in awe of head
ILWU counsel Richard Gladstein. Harris had been one of the judges
involved in the early post-World War II (McCarthy) era during which
the federal government made several "witch-hunt" attempts to deport
Harry Bridges. Gladstein was Bridges' main counsel when the bulk of
San Fransicso's power elite still considered the ILWU president a
threat. We plaintiffs wondered what effect the past might have now
that Bridges was in great favor as a "labor statesman" and member of
the Port Commission.
For me, one of the greatest shocks at trial was supplied by the long
opening statement given by head PMA counsel Richard Ernst. The
opening statement of our lawyer, Arthur Brunwasser, had focused on
16. For further detail see the review of Larrowe's book by Clancy Sigal, then a
stranger to the case, in The New York Times Book Review, January 7, 1973, at 3; the
discussion by Bridges, The New York Times Book Review, February 18, 1973, at 32;
followed by my own discussion, The New York Times Book Review, May 13, 1973, at
34.
17. Civil suit No.42284 in the court of Judge George B. Harris.
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the specifics of the discharges and the absence of all fairness in the
process. Ernst laid a foundation for the case on grounds vastly different
from Brunwasser's. He took an openly political approach. He recounted
how, in 1919, the waterfront employers had broken the waterfront un-
ions, initiating a fifteen-year period of oppressive experience by long-
shoremen. The strikes of 1934 re-established the union and ushered in
a fourteen-year period of militant confrontation between the union and
employers. After the strike of 1948, Ernst pointed out, the employers
embarked on the "third period." They saw that the union was maturing
and so began an era of increased trust and collaboration. Around 1958
they felt that the union had made so much progress that its members
could participate in the process of selecting new men for the industry.
Four years later the witnessed development of maturity within the
union caused the employer to involve the union in the firing process as
well. He then pointed out that we plaintiffs were the first product of
both maturity-proving developments.
Ernst's opening statement developed full direction on January 23
and continued, with routine interruptions, over several days. He made
the logic of his case absolutely explicit; if the judge ruled for the defen-
dants he would be in the company of a long list of great social engi-
neers such as Wayne Morse and Clark Kerr who -helped structure an
intricate and operational working arrangement between a large em-
ployer and union in a vital industry. If, on the other hand, the judge
ruled for the plaintiffs he would be destroying labor peace. Contrary to
my first impression, the counsel for the PMA was not wide of the
mark, he was right on it. He was operating on the premise that had
increasingly directed the development of labor policy in all three
branches of our government since passage of the Taft-Hartley Act: the
promotion of "labor peace" through containment of the work force via
collaborative contractual arrangements which essentially substituted
arbitration for any concerted action by the workers. According to
Ernst, our deregistrations symbolized such an accomplishment and it
should not be tampered with.
The last shocking segment of the trial, possibly for all participants,
came on the last day testimony was presented. Attorney James A.
Carter, former PMA lawyer and legal staff member of the Port Labor
Relations Committee (JPLRC) at the time of the 1963 deregistrations,
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I had heard28 that Mr. Weir was one of the persons that was being
deregistered; that it was very definite that he should be deregis-
tered; and there was simply no doubt in my mind, and I believe in
the minds of the other people who worked on the case, that the
feelings were very strong that Mr. Weir should be
deregistered ...
Well, what I heard was that Mr. Weir was opposed to the M
and M agreement, that he wanted to make work for people and
stop the use of labor saving devices and things; that he was inter-
ested in more longshoremen, et cetera; and that that ran counter to
the prevailing views of Mr. Bridges. I think it was more-what I
heard was a philosophical thing-presumably, this lost case had
been made public-that he was philosophically opposed to the con-
cept of M and M; that he was of the old fashioned union school
that felt you ought to have a lot of people out three working, and
you shouldn't have labor saving devices."9
Finally, and only as the trial neared conclusion, the court got its
first opportunity to understand not only the major reason behind the
discharges, but why we were being pursued with such hostility. Earlier
in the trial the court had heard testimony by Curt Johnston, then presi-
dent of ILWU Local 13 (Los Angeles), that a former San Francisco
employee, Robert Hall, had told him how "eighty-two had been fired
just to get Weir." Hall subsequently testified that Johnston had
fabricated the story. Later toward the end of Carter's testimony, an
explanation very similar to Johnston's was offered:
But what I did hear was that the-that a decision was made at a
very high level-and those words may not have been used ei-
ther-but I can read. . .shorthand-but that a decision had been
made to deregister Mr. Weir; and that in order to facilitate that, I
suppose, it was decided to deregister other people at the same
time.20
We had heard this theory several times, twice directly, from
ILWU staff employees who were disillusioned with Bridges, but be-
cause they were still in the employ of the union their depositions proved
18. It had been established in earlier testimony that the source was PMA staff
representatives with whom Carter was working at the time.
19. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Assn, Reporters Partial Transcript, July 3,
1974, at 10-11, 12.
20. Id. at 52.
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fruitless. Nevertheless, to have heard the theory early on had value. It
forced us to think through our own analysis of the ILWU-PMA strat-
egy with greater care. There was probably no way that we would ever
be able to prove or disprove the theory but its persistence showed us the
potential for vindictiveness with which we were dealing. We agreed
with the political analyses put forth by Herman Benson and Gordon
Haskell of the Association for Union Democracy: Bridges represented a
highly developed bureaucratic conservatism that retaliated full force
against even the slightest potential of opposition, no matter how far in
the future it might take to materialize."
On August 31, 1975, Judge Harris ruled for the defendants. The
defendants had won based on the argument that B men were proba-
tionary employees and not union members. Yet, Bridges' handpicked
successor as president of the ILWU, James Herman had become presi-
dent of an ILWU local union in the 1960s as a B man. In a post-trial
meeting for the plaintiffs our attorney told us that the judge had not
even written the decision. Instead, he had taken the closing brief of
PMA counsel Ernst, transferred it to court stationery and applied his
signature. The content of the decision offered an even more detailed
interpretation of the political conflict on the San Francisco waterfront:
43. Factions developed within Local 10 on the subject of promotion
of the limited registration Class B men. One group included Selden
Osborne, Asher Harer, Hal Yanow, Frank Stout, James Kearney
and others; it favored the granting of union membership to the lim-
ited registration class B men and their dispatch with the fully reg-
istered Class A longshoremen, even though this would be in viola-
tion of the contract and the law. Another faction included Harry
Bridges, William Chester, Robert Rohatch, Tommie Silas and
others; it was of the opinion that the union should comply with the
contract with the PMA and promote only on the basis of joint ac-
tion between the ILWU and the PMA 2
There was a quarter truth to Ernst's (Judge Harris') interpretation
of the political fight within Local 10. The first group had all individu-
21. H. Benson, Harry Bridges' Own Witch-Hunt, 13 UNION DEMOCRACY IN Ac-
TION, (Sept. 1964); Haskell, review of Charles P. Larrowe's biography of Harry
Bridges, 4 UNION DEMOCRACY REVIEW, (Summer 1973).
22. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law Lodged by Defendants, PMA, ILWU, Local 10. Civil No.42284 GBH at
14-15 (Mimeograph of original).
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ally, at one time or another, taken the floor of a union meeting to op-
pose our deregistration but they had never operated as a faction. It had
been many years since any who opposed Bridges had felt secure enough
to organize against his ideas in concert. It was rather shrewd of Ernst
to wait until the very end to offer this interpretation and thus leave no
chance that our side might begin to dispute his distinctly political
interpretation.
After the setback at trial, we once more appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, with very different results. The political cli-
mate in the entire nation had changed markedly in the decade since the
appellate court had ordered that we be given a trial. Oral argument on
our appeal took place on February 5, 1979. To get there had taken yet
another fund drive with donations from many well wishers. Once more
we filled the court room to capacity but it did not appear to have any
visual effect on the judges.
The argument took little more than two hours. We left with an
uneasiness we could not shake. We felt it would be impossible for the
judges to do ample research in the more than twenty cases of printed
matter which constituted the record in our case. Even more disturbing,
we had not heard them ask what we considered the substantive ques-
tions in the case.
Judges Duniway, Kennedy and Bonsal handed down their opinion
a year and two days after taking argument.23 Their conclusion was,
We believe that the district court erred in concluding that ap-
pellants failed to exhaust required grievance procedures. We never-
theless affirm on the merits because appellants have not demon-
strated that PMA or ILWU or its constitutent local breached
either a duty of fair representation owed to appellants or the terms
of the Pacific Coast Longshore Agreement.2'
We were sixteen years down the road when hit by this decision.
No longer were we in awe of the court. Underneath their robes these
three men wore pants that they got into one leg at a time just like other
mortals. The gap between the letter of the law and the way life is actu-
ally lived was so wide for them that an "Alice in Wonderland" logic
dictated the terms of their decision. They agreed that the ILWU and
the PMA had denied us due process, but ruled there was no evidence
23. Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617 F.2d 1321, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 17.
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that the union had failed in its duty to represent us fairly. Yet due
process is the forum or vehicle that makes representation possible. The
two are totally interdependent. There cannot be one without the other.
For the justices, unjust means could somehow be used to arrive at a
just end.
From beginning to end, a pivotal area of the law which was ap-
plied to our case was whether or not the acts of the defendants had
been legitimized by the collectively bargained agreement. In 1967, one
of the major reasons for the Ninth Circuit's reversal of Judge Harris'
summary judgment against us was that the new rules used to discharge
us had not been arrived at via the collective bargaining process. Con-
trary to this, Judges Duniway, Kennedy and Bonsai held that the new
rules had been negotiated into existence by the two parties on the Joint
Port Labor Relations Committee (JPLRC). The July 16, 1963 minutes
of the JPLRC cited earlier here were still among the case exhibits.
They revealed that the union members of the committee, who would
have had to be half of the negotiating effort, were protesting our dis-
charges because the new rules had not been adopted by the bargaining
process.
In an example of "doublethink," the decision of the Ninth Circuit
also held that the new rules were actually not new at all. The court
observed that we appellants knew, for example, that our "dues" should
be paid on time and that fact was not changed by the creation of a
new, additional and maximum disciplinary penalty. In fact, the addi-
tion was legitimate for them because the well known Section 9 of the
1958 rules covering deregistration contained an eleventh "or, for any
other cause" rule.
The underlying rationale of the judges on this aspect was not hard
to determine: the new mechanized technology that was being intro-
duced to the industry in the early 1960s demanded the creation of a
"permanent work force" composed of high caliber individuals; by ap-
plying the new rules (or penalties) the employer and the union were
setting the standards necessary to the needs of the new era; the old era
in which all jobs went through the hiring hall was now in the past; the
deregistration of people who had a propensity for unreliability repre-
sented an imperative updating whose correctness and success was indi-
cated by the fact that eighty percent of the 1959 B men met the higher
standards. The final block of reasoning in the stone wall erected against
us by the courts was tragically laughable: because, in a hostage taking
operation, a large number escaped being taken showed them that none
of those taken were hostages.
[Vol. 8
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On the surface, the court was refusing to see that our discharges
were part of a conflict but, below the surface, other factors were at
work. The unjust decision of the Ninth Circuit unknowingly gave sup-
port to Professor James B. Atleson's thesis on the values underlying
decisions on labor cases by the courts, "[t]he belief in the inherent
rights of property and the need for capital mobility, for instance, un-
derlie certain rules, and some decisions turn on the perceived superior
need for continued production or the fear of employee
irresponsibility. 2 5
We appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. There were two
court decisions against us and only a narrow margin of hope, but the
majority of the plaintiffs needed their jobs back as much then as we did
the day we were fired. Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, it had
become harder to raise the money to cover legal expenses and, by 1980,
six of the plaintiffs had died. Others had moved in order to obtain em-
ployment. Some, like Manual Nereu, were as far away as Saudi Ara-
bia. Mario Luppi had returned home to his family's village in Italy. I
had been living in the Los Angeles harbor area for five years and had
resided in Illinois during the previous eight years. Communication was
more and more difficult to sustain but the necessary mobilization was
made easier when Teamsters for a Democratic Union, Independent
Skilled Trades Council, Union Women's Alliance to Gain Equality,
The Bell Wringer, National Labor Law Center of the National Law-
yers' Guild and Association for Union Democracy offered to file a
friend of the court brief on our behalf.2 6
The brief authored by Burton Hall stimulated new interest. It gave
added emphasis to the arguments made by Attorney Brunwasser. For
example, it showed that the written job dispatch rules provided us until
the day of our discharge ended with the capitalized statement:
"THERE ARE NO OTHER RULES." The brief by attorney Hall
also contained what for us was a new idea; the union's agreement to
deregister us was a bill of attainder:
In 1963, at the time that Local 10 and ILWY agreed to the
new "standards" and agreed, also, to deregister those "B men" who
failed to meet those "standards" because of conduct prior to their
25. J. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW, 2 (1983)
(Atleson is a professor of law at State University of New York, Buffalo).
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adoption, the identities of those persons who would thereby be de-
registered were either known or were easily ascertainable from
records in the bargaining representative's possession.
Thus it was known or could easily be learned from the records
that Graves had been found guilty of an instance of intoxication in
1960 and had been suspended for 30 days as punishment. It was
known or could easily be learned from the records that Cafeterio
had, however innocently, committed a Low Man Out violation in
1962 of more than ten hours by failing to add hours to his time for
his unavailability on Sunday, August 12.
The decision to deregister the class of persons who were shown
by the records to have committed any violations of the "standards"
was, in short, a bill of attainder.2"
The Supreme Court, in its October 1980 term, denied all briefs
filed for the plaintiffs. We were finished. It felt just that abrupt. The
case had been a central activity half our adult lives and a period of
adjustment was forced upon all participants.
IV. Epilogue
The previous sections represent only one small portion of the Wil-
liams v. PMA story. The events profoundly affected all of our lives.
Some among us were more fortunate than others in rebuilding work
careers and keeping our families together after the discharges. The
story of every man and his family deserves telling and if told would
reveal that anguish can develop strength as well as diminish it.28
27. In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 1980, Williams v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101
(1981). Motion of Teamsters for a Democratic Union for leave to File Brief as Amid
Curiae in Support of Petition for Certiorari and Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition for Certiorari, p. 16.
28. The names of all plaintiffs are: George R. Williams, William Jones, Paul
May, Eathan Gums Jr., Edgar J. Dunlap, Walter L. Robinson, Frank Nereu, Louis T.
Lacy, Leroy J. Provost, Roger W. Fleeton, Robert E. Birks, Anthony Melvin Jr., Oliver
Geeter, Antonio S. Cafeteiro, Edward Reed, Albert W. Roberts, Percy Fountain, Wil-
liam J. Hurst Jr., Willie C. Merritt, Mack Hebert, Manuel Neureu Jr., Arthur G.
Winters, Frank Giannino, Stanley L. Weir, Fred Hayes, Willie J. Whitehead, Rhody
Adams, Mario V. Luppi, Arthur L. Hughes, Jeremiah Richards, Cleo Love, Louis J.
Richardson, Charles J. Johnson, Reginald W. Saunders, Willie Jenkins Jr., Willie D.
Palmer, Conway T. Hudson, John T. Leggett, Alfred Straughter, Thomas Nisby,
Timothy E. Carter, James U. Carter, Melvin Kennedy, Henry Imperial, James Lang-
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We surviving plaintiffs make no claim to objectivity, and that ap-
plies as well to the opinions expressed in this article. Like all who are
party to a violent fight, with many casualties, we will never cease to be
partisan. The human costs have been high in many ways. One of the
most oppressive aspects of our experience with the law was our inability
to afford the financial costs. In our view, any legal action in which the
attorneys are to be paid on a contingency basis is in deep trouble if it
lasts more than -a few months. A case with the workload the size of
ours quickly became destructive to our lawyer's personal life and pro-
fessional image. It is true that in the beginning there was gratification
by the very nature of the case. But we witnessed the coming of those
times when other attorneys would loudly call across court building lob-
bies with derisive guffaws: "Hey, you still have that big five (ten,
fifteen) year old law suit?" We watched as our attorneys overworked
without pay. The greater their resentment and our guilt, the more we
felt like charity cases and lost client control over direction of the suit.
This resulted in the destruction of friendships and the development of
deep doubts.2 9
ford, Johnny J. Cherry, Ellis E. Graves, James Green, Ulysses Hawkins, Theodore Tol-
liver, Lawrence Johnson, and Herman Crawford.
29. Over the years substantial changes were made in the theory of our case and
its presentation to the courts. The shift was away from a focus on the political motiva-
tions which had led to the discharge, to a concentration on the lack of just cause-yes,
we had been wronged, but an analysis of why was missing. This weakened and under-
cut the case of the plaintiff who had most been involved in the politics of the industry
as an elected representative of the B men, myself. In turn, all of us felt that this served
to undercut the entire case. The change became documented in our appellants reply
brief to the Ninth Circuit Court: "Similarly, defendants set up a 'strawman' in the
guise of one of the fifty-one of the plaintiffs, Stanley Weir, and emphasize his philo-
sophical musings of defendants' intention." Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617
F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980). Appeal from a Final Judgment of the United States Dis-
trict Court of the Northern District of California, Appellants Reply Brief No. 77-1398,
at 4, served Oct. 11, 1978.
The "philosophical musing" referred to an explanation of how the fight of the B
men for union representation, while not an organized factional war, was automatically
antagonistic to the mechanization program of Harry Bridges and his eager acceptance
of the employers' automation plans.
When the time came for filing an appeal for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court we gathered together closely once more in the Bay Area. The LJDC
steering committee was again able to hold meetings. About the time that the Teamsters
for a Democratic Union began to develop a brief in support of the issues in our case,
and in reaction to criticism from long time supporter Sam Bottone, we again began to
act like full fledged clients. We realized it was our last shot and that we would have to
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There are several areas in which some generalization of our expe-
rience can be made. We would not have filed suit in 1964, had we
known that the action would take so many years. At the same time, by
1964, the only alternatives to filing suit was to walk away in submis-
sion, and that was unthinkable. That we put up a good long fight is a
source of pride. It is gratifying to hear, as we still do from former co-
workers on the front, that the men of the four B lists recruited after
our discharge got much better treatment from the ILWU and PMA
because of our suit. Another outbreak of resistance after ours, espe-
cially a second lawsuit, might have triggered alliances and the reversal
of bureaucratic victories.
A statement commonly heard among LJDC veterans is that we
stuck together through it all, and, as a result, we formed unusually
strong bonds of friendship and experienced considerable personal
growth by getting an inside look at the way law actually works in our
land. We have seen that labor law is a special segment of the total
body of American common law. In worker-employer-union conflicts,
the worker often does not have due process protection as guaranteed by
the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Labor law legitimizes the loss,
makes it legal and provides a framework for the application of private
government in the workplace by employer rules as modified by em-
ployee resistance.
live with the outcome every bit as much as our attorney. We asked for a meeting with
counsel. After several refusals to even entertain the idea of meeting with us to discuss
any questions we might have, we sent a formal request, by letter, for a meeting. After
all briefs were filed with the court, Attorney Brunwasser sent the committee a twenty-
one page letter with a copy to every plaintiff. It attacked me and made strong inference
that I was guilty of the charges alleged by the employer and union, explaining that
while this had been known for some time it was not brought out because I was the best
fund raiser in the case. Prior to receipt of the letter not a particle of distrust had ever
entered my mind. We of the steering committee had always played the role of liasion
with and defender of our attorney in relation to the rest of the LJDC membership. The
other members of the steering committee immediately responded with a letter that re-
jected any validity in his accusations. In turn, they too were cut off as if for increased
disloyalty and personal affront.
The problem between us clients and our attorney of record got escalated, very
probably without hope of solution, and will ever remain a source of grief and loss. We
have no way of making an accurate unbiased analysis of its causes. But as we look back
to learn what we might have done differently, one thing is certain: over the years we
should have given more recognition to the labors of Arthur Brunwasser while he was in
the process of providing them. Acknowledgment is an essential form of nutrition.
Shakespeare reminds us by exaggeration as the good Kent responds to Cordelia in King
Lear, "[a]cknowledged is o'er paid."
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I agree with the idea expressed in varied contexts by labor attor-
ney Staughton Lynd that the filing of a lawsuit is not by itself an effec-
tive way to fight and often creates an artificial context in which facts
become distorted.30 It is more effective to use the lawsuit as a back-up
action and only as a last resort."1 We could have pursued a return to
our jobs far more effectively with continued organizational support and
with some form of political-organizational support from the general
public, particularly in the Bay Area community. We feel certain our
story would be quite different if we had recevied even the most indirect
support from the membership of ILWU Local 10, and especially if
there had been the development of open resistance to containerization.
In the absence of direct support of any kind, we needed far more back-
ing from public sources than we were able to generate and maintain.
The availability of the documents in our case to public scrutiny
and research is a positive development." Still unnoticed anywhere, for
example, is the fact that by simple self-interest and self-preservation B
men became critical of Harry Bridges because of the conservatism of
his leadership and his eager acceptance of the employers' new technol-
ogy program. Quite logically, those who cast their lot with the B men
or came to their defense both from inside the industry and from the
public, were persons who were viewed as having a more radical world
view than Bridges; probably a very threatening experience for a labor
official whose entire method of operation historically had been based
upon presenting himself as a leftist.
The largest and most important part of the fight continues on the
job in every port. More than half the 15,000 registered longshore jobs
that existed in 1963 have been automated out of existence. We were
the first mortalities in an ongoing liquidation. There is not a day in
30. LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL
CLOSINGS 146-7 (1982).
31. Id.
32. The Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court, Northern Dis-
trict of California, in San Francisco provides access to case files stored in San Mateo,
California. Taped interviews of approximately thirty of the deregistered longshoremen
conducted by Elinor Randall Keeney will soon be deposited with the Regional History
Office of the Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley. This library con-
tains extensive interviews with the late Paul St. Sure, former PMA president. An inter-
view of Stan Weir by Paul Buhle is on file in the Oral History Department, University
of California at Los Angeles. Numerous documents on this case collected by the plain-
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which the remaining seven thousand rank and file west coast
dockworkers do not have to resist. It is they who need allies, primarily
in other industries and unions, but within the informed public as well.
Plans for the "Second Containerization Revolution" by computer con-
trols are emerging from the drawing boards in greater numbers. The
number of options available have diminished for both sides, particularly
for the workers, who now have much less faith in established grievance
solution channels.
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